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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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____________ 
 
No. 10-1776 
____________          
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v. 
 
ANTHONY E. MONTGOMERY, 
                              Appellant 
___________                       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 3-09-cr-000386-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2010 
 
Before:    BARRY, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 14, 2010 ) 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Anthony E. Montgomery (“Montgomery”) appeals the District Court‟s 
denial of his motion to suppress his confession as involuntary.  Although he admits to 
being a “seasoned arrestee,” he claims that his “mental state, coupled with [an FBI 
Agent‟s] false promise of an immediate transfer into federal custody in exchange for [his] 
confession, was so powerful as to negate the voluntariness of Montgomery‟s confession.”  
(Appellant‟s Br. at 14.)  The Government argues that the record supports the voluntary 
nature of Montgomery‟s confession and, therefore, the District Court‟s denial of his 
motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.    For the following reasons, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 On May 1, 2008, Montgomery was arrested on state charges after he fled a motor 
vehicle traffic stop in Tinton Falls, New Jersey.  After his arrest, Montgomery was sent to 
Monmouth County Correctional Institute (“MCCI”), a New Jersey state prison facility.  
While at MCCI, Montgomery became a suspect in a federal investigation concerning the 
armed robbery of a Sovereign Bank branch in Toms River, New Jersey. 
 Eight days after Montgomery‟s arrest, FBI Special Agent R. J. Gallagher met with 
him to take his fingerprints and ask him about the bank robbery.  Montgomery told 
Gallagher that he had “no statement” concerning the robbery, and the interview ceased.  
Subsequently, Agent Gallagher obtained via subpoena recordings of Montgomery‟s 
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phone calls from the MCCI and listened to them as part of his bank robbery investigation.  
According to Agent Gallagher, Montgomery‟s telephone calls made references to a 
potential prison escape, and he alerted MCCI authorities.  Consequently, Montgomery 
was moved from the general population to J-Pod, an area used to house prison inmates 
who require greater supervision. 
 While in J-Pod, Montgomery was charged with committing, inter alia, Unlawful 
Possession of a Weapon, Aggravated Assault, Assault of a Corrections Officer, Criminal 
Attempt, and Possession of Escape Implements.  On May 27, 2008, MCCI correctional 
officers found a “shank” knife in Montgomery‟s possession, and on November 7, 2008, 
several correctional officers restrained Montgomery, who was assaulting another 
correctional officer.  As a result of these incidents, Montgomery alleged that various 
correctional officers retaliated against him by tampering with his food and verbally 
abusing him.  He claimed, moreover, to be frequently shuffled between prison cells, 
unable to sleep, and continuously hungry because he refused to eat his meals. 
 Unhappy with his prison conditions, Montgomery directed his attorney to file a 
motion to have him transferred to another state prison institution.  After his motion was 
denied, Montgomery told his attorney to set up a meeting with Agent Gallagher, to 
inform the agent that he desired to be transferred into federal custody, and to notify Agent 
Gallagher that he would be “interested” in what Montgomery had to say.  In his own 
words, Montgomery “[p]retty much” understood that if he gave a statement to Agent 
Gallagher, then he would be transferred to a federal correctional facility.  (A. 126.)  
Agent Gallagher, however, merely indicated to Montgomery‟s attorneys that he believed 
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it was possible to move their client into federal custody, and never promised counsel that 
such a transfer could be arranged.  (A. 135, 137, 144.) 
 On March 16, 2009, Agent Gallagher interviewed Montgomery concerning the 
Sovereign Bank robbery in Toms River.  The interview was videotaped and a transcript 
was made.  Agent Gallagher read Montgomery his Miranda rights, which Montgomery 
waived, agreeing to speak without his attorney present.  (A. 242-43.)  In fact, prior to the 
interview, Montgomery had made it clear to his attorney that he wanted to talk to Agent 
Gallagher by “himself,” and that “[h]e didn‟t want [counsel] there.”  (A. 107.)  After 
reading Montgomery his rights, Agent Gallagher stated that he was “not here to make any 
promises . . . [and] I can‟t promise you anything[.]”  (A. 243.)  Nonetheless, Montgomery 
proceeded to fully confess that he committed the bank robbery, and details of how he 
committed it. 
 Subsequently, Montgomery filed a motion to suppress his confession.  Finding 
that the confession was made knowingly and voluntarily, the District Court denied 
Montgomery‟s motion.  After a bench trial, the District Court found Montgomery guilty 
of bank robbery by force or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and of 
using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  
Following entry of the judgment of conviction and sentence, Montgomery timely 
appealed, challenging only the denial of his suppression motion. 
II. 
It is well settled that “only voluntary confessions may be admitted at the trial of 
guilt or innocence[.]”  United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 288-89 (3d Cir. 1994) 
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(quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478 (1972)).  “To determine the voluntariness 
of a confession, the court must consider the effect that the totality of the circumstances 
had upon the will of the defendant.”  Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 604 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(citations omitted).   “The question in each case is whether the defendant‟s will was 
overborne when he confessed.”  Id.  “In determining whether a defendant‟s will was 
overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed . . . both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation.”  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
226 (1973) (listing factors such as youth of accused, lack of education, lack of advising 
accused of constitutional rights, repeated and prolonged interrogation, “and the use of 
physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep”) (citations omitted).  We 
“review the district court's denial of the motion to suppress for clear error as to the 
underlying facts, but exercise plenary review as to its legality in light of the court's 
properly found facts.”  United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 
Applying the totality of the circumstances test and discerning no clear error as to 
the District Court‟s factual findings, we conclude that Montgomery‟s confession was 
made voluntarily and knowingly.  He was a seasoned arrestee and was explicitly advised 
of his constitutional rights.  While it does appear that he was sleep-deprived and felt 
mistreated by the correctional officers, the record undisputedly shows that Mr. 
Montgomery initiated the interview by directing his attorney to set up a meeting with 
Agent Gallagher to discuss the Sovereign Bank robbery.  (A. 242-43.)  Agent Gallagher‟s 
conduct was not coercive.  While he informed MCCI authorities that Montgomery was 
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making possible escape references on the telephone,
1
 he had nothing to do with where 
Montgomery was relocated.  Agent Gallagher was never asked, nor did he express an 
opinion, concerning Montgomery‟s prison cell arrangements.  Additionally, Agent 
Gallagher stated repeatedly to Montgomery that he was not making any promises in 
exchange for the confession.  (A. 243, 244, 246, 268, 272, 275.)  As the District Court 
aptly noted, the “fact that [Mr. Montgomery] had an agenda of his own—i.e., to transfer 
into federal custody—does not transform this interaction with federal agents into a forced 
confession.”  (A. 8-9.) Ultimately, Montgomery‟s “confession [was] the product of an 
essentially free and unconstrained choice[.]”  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.     
                                              
1 Montgomery stated, inter alia, on the telephone: 
 
He will be out soon; When his opportunity comes, he will be taking it; „When this 
shit happens, no one will believe it;‟ He will be on the run; The whole „hood‟ will be 
talking about him and what he has done; His stock will be the highest in the hood. 
 
(A. 197.) 
 
